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Abstract. The eﬃciency of two diﬀerent means of controlling hazardous
economic activities, namely ex post liability for harm done and ex ante safety reg-
ulation, is re-examined. Some researchers have stressed that the complementary
use of these two instruments can be socially advantageous. Here it is argued that
the models which have been built in order to support this view crucially depend on
the assumption that there are persistent enforcement errors. It is demonstrated
that such a rather unsatisfactory assumption is not needed if wealth varies among
injurers.
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1 Introduction
A lasting and controversial discussion in the law and economics literature is con-
cerned with the issue of whether tort liability or safety regulation is best suited
for controlling accident risks.1 Ex post liability and ex ante regulation (safety
standards) are generally viewed as substitutes for correcting externalities, and
the usual recommendation is to employ the policy which leads to lower admin-
istrative costs. However, the phenomenon of complementary use of liability and
regulation is widespread in practice. In the United States, for example, there are
technological regulations as well as codifications of liability as far as the gener-
ation and disposal of hazardous wastes are concerned.2 Yet, I am aware of only
two papers which try to demonstrate formally that the joint use of liability and
regulation can enhance social welfare: Shavell (1984a) and Kolstad, Ulen, and
Johnson (1990). While these articles provide valuable insights, they leave some
important questions unanswered.
Specifically, Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson (1990) assume that liability is ineﬃ-
cient due to uncertainty about the court’s behavior. This leads to some technical
diﬃculties which are briefly discussed in Ewerhart and Schmitz (1998). What is
more important is the fact that Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson (1990) cannot explain
why liability should be used at all, since in their model pure regulation can always
implement socially optimal behavior.
In Shavell’s (1984a) model, which is more closely related to the analysis in the
1For early discussions of related issues see Calabresi (1970), Weitzman (1974) and Wittman
(1977). Shavell (1984b) provides a comprehensive non-technical analysis of the subject. More
recent articles include Rose-Ackerman (1991), Söllner (1994, 1996) and Schwarze (1996).
2The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1982) imposes technological regulations on
the generation of toxic wastes, while under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (1979) victims can sue generators of hazardous wastes for the
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages.
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present paper, liability is ineﬃcient due to injurers’ limited wealth, while regula-
tion is also ineﬃcient because the same regulatory standard applies to all injurers
(whereas socially optimal behavior varies among injurers). The fact that in his
model a hybrid of liability and regulation can do better than either approach alone
crucially relies on his assumption that liability is handicapped by enforcement er-
rors. There is a strictly positive probability that injurers can escape suit, and the
magnitude of liability is determined in a suboptimal way. While it is certainly
true that courts make mistakes, it seems to be unsatisfactory to base a theory on
the assumption that the same kind of error persistently occurs.
In the next section, a convenient variant of the now familiar economic model of
tort law is introduced.3 It is argued in Section 3 that if injurers cannot escape suit
or, more generally, if the magnitude of liability is calculated in an optimal way, it
can never be socially advantageous to employ liability and regulation at the same
time. This result, which is in stark contrast with Shavell (1984a), is obtained
under his original assumption that all injurers face the same wealth constraint.
In Section 4, however, it is proved that joint use of liability and safety regu-
lation can indeed be optimal if wealth varies among injurers. This seems to be
a plausible and simple reason for joint use of liability and regulation which may
also be more important than enforcement errors.4 In addition, it is shown that in
this case the regulatory standard should be set at a level which is smaller than
3See Calabresi (1970), Brown (1973), and the more recent models of Endres (1989) and
Kaplow and Shavell (1996). For surveys see Schäfer and Ott (1995, pp. 95—319), Shavell (1987),
and Emons (1990).
4The role of limited wealth is by now well recognized in the law and economics literature,
but the possible importance of individuals’ heterogeneity with respect to wealth limitations has
mostly been neglected. See Polinsky and Shavell (1991) for a notable exception, albeit in a quite
diﬀerent context.
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the standard which is socially optimal if regulation alone is used.5 Finally, some
concluding remarks follow in the last section. It is argued that the main result of
Section 3, which contradicts Shavell’s (1984a) and Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson’s
(1990) view that joint use of liability and regulation can enhance social welfare,
may well re-emerge if more general forms of regulation are considered. All proofs
have been relegated to the appendix.
2 The basic model
In the model, risk-neutral parties engage in hazardous economic activities from
which accidents can occur.6 According to the classification of Shavell (1987), only
unilateral accidents are considered, i.e., no decisions have to be made by potential
victims. However, potential injurers can reduce the probability of causing an
accident by taking precaution. Let x ∈ [0, 1] denote the verifiable level of care
chosen by an injurer. Care is normalized so that an accident will be caused by this
injurer with probability 1− x. An injurer’s cost of taking precaution is given by
the function C(x), which is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly convex,
where C(0) = C 0(0) = 0 and limx→1C 0(x) = ∞.7 Let h be the magnitude of
harm if an accident occurs. When an injurer decides how much care to take,
the harm he may cause is known only to himself. Yet, it is common knowledge
5This confirms central conjectures of Shavell (1984a) and Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson (1990),
even though the underlying logic will be diﬀerent.
6It will be assumed throughout that the utility which an injurer derives from engaging in his
activity is suﬃciently large, so that the decision whether or not to engage in the activity need
not be modelled explicitly. Cf. Shavell (1987).
7While the costs of taking care are nonpecuniary, they are measured in monetary units. This
formalization has an advantage over the one chosen by Shavell (1984a), where one might be
tempted to interpret expenditures on care to be monetary, although only the damage payments
are subject to wealth constraints.
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that h is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function F (h) which
is supposed to be strictly increasing on the unit interval.8 Once an accident has
occurred, h can be verified.9
The socially optimal amount of precaution that an injurer of type h should
choose, x∗(h), can be obtained by minimizing the sum of the costs of care and of
harm done,
C(x) + (1− x)h.
Thus, the socially optimal level of care is characterized by the first-order condition
C 0(x∗(h)) = h, (1)
which of course means that the marginal cost of precaution equals the harm that
the injurer causes if an accident occurs. Implicit diﬀerentiation shows that the
function x∗(h) is strictly increasing,
dx∗(h)
dh
=
1
C 00(x∗(h))
> 0. (2)
I say that ‘the first best is achieved’ if an injurer of type h chooses the socially
optimal level of care, x∗(h).
3 Wealth does not vary among injurers
The first policy instrument to be considered is ex ante safety regulation. This
instrument is completely characterized by a single regulatory minimum standard
8The assumption that h ∈ [0, 1] is made for expositional purposes only. No additional insights
could be gained by assuming h ∈ [a, b], where 0 ≤ a < b.
9Note that apart from the potential harm, h, injurers are identical in every respect, which
is a usual assumption in the standard economic model of tort law. Furthermore, notice that
there is no interaction among injurers (in particular, the probability that an injurer causes an
accident does not depend on the precaution of other injurers). Hence, one can focus on a single
representative injurer who is privately informed about his type h.
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s ∈ [0, 1], to which parties must adhere in order to engage in their activity. Since
taking precaution is costly, no injurer will voluntarily choose a higher level of care,
so that under regulation each injurer chooses xR = s, independent of his type h.
Therefore, the socially optimal standard can be found by minimizing expected
total costs
TCR(s) = E (C(s) + (1− s)h) .
The first-order condition is given by
C 0(sR) = E(h), (3)
which says that the marginal cost of care equals the expected harm. The optimal
regulatory standard is hence given by sR = x∗(E(h)), i.e., by the level of precau-
tion that would be socially optimal for an injurer who could cause the average
level of harm, E(h).
The second instrument to be analyzed is ex post liability. It will be postulated
throughout that liability is strict, so that an injurer who has caused an accident
is required to pay damages L to the victim, regardless of how much care has
been taken.10 Assume that an injurer might escape suit and let q denote the
probability of suit, where 0 < q ≤ 1.11 Furthermore, let y denote the injurer’s
level of wealth, so that he will actually pay only min{L, y} if an accident occurs
and suit is brought. Then the injurer’s problem is to minimize
C(x) + (1− x)qmin{L, y}
over the amount of care, x. Hence, the first-order condition reads C 0(xL) =
qmin{L, y}, and the level of care under strict liability is thus given by xL =
10Strict liability is considered in order to facilitate comparison with Shavell (1984a). Under
the negligence rule, the formulae would look slightly more complicated, but qualitatively the
main insights would still be true. See Summers (1983) and Shavell (1986).
11Note that by assumption q does not depend on the identity of the injurer.
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x∗(qmin{L, y}). Anticipating the behavior of injurers, it is possible to calculate
the optimal magnitude of liability:12
Lemma 1 The optimal magnitude of liability is given by L∗ = 1qh.
In what follows, it is always assumed that the magnitude of liability is given by
L∗. Since sole use of liability can obviously implement the first-best if the injurer’s
wealth is suﬃciently large, only the non-trivial case y ≤ 1q will be considered. Then
the expected total costs under liability are given by
TCL(y) =
Z qy
0
(C(x∗(h)) + (1− x∗(h))h) dF (h)
+
Z 1
qy
(C(x∗(qy)) + (1− x∗(qy))h) dF (h).
Finally, joint use of regulation and liability will be analyzed. Due to regu-
lation, the injurer’s level of precaution must not be smaller than some standard,
s > 0. Only sometimes will liability induce injurers to overcomply with respect
to this standard. Therefore, two cases have to be considered. If s > x∗(qy), joint
use of regulation and liability is in fact equivalent to exclusive use of regulation
(recall that xL is never larger than x∗(qy)), so that the expected social costs are
given by TCR(s). If however s ≤ x∗(qy), the injurer chooses xJ = max{s, xL} =
max {s, x∗(min{h, qy})} and expected total costs read
TCJ(s, y) =
Z C0(s)
0
(C(s) + (1− s)h) dF (h)
+
Z qy
C0(s)
(C(x∗(h)) + (1− x∗(h))h) dF (h)
+
Z 1
qy
(C(x∗(qy)) + (1− x∗(qy))h) dF (h).
It is now possible to compare the expected social costs which arise in the three
diﬀerent regimes. The following proposition shows that the essential finding of
12The damage multiplier 1q is sometimes called punitive multiple (see Cooter and Ulen, 1988,
or Cooter, 1991).
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Shavell (1984a), which says that joint use of regulation and liability can be strictly
welfare increasing, does not hold, provided that the magnitude of liability is given
by Lemma 1.13
Proposition 1 Assume that the level of wealth, y, is the same for each injurer.
If y is smaller than a certain threshold value yˆ, where 0 < yˆ < E(h)q , it is optimal
to use regulation as the sole means of controlling risk. Otherwise, it is optimal to
use liability only. In particular, social welfare can never be increased by the joint
use of regulation and liability.
Loosely speaking, the main argument is as follows. Recall that (by Lemma 1)
liability alone can implement the socially optimal level of care if h ≤ qy.Additional
regulation could only decrease welfare in this case, by making injurers choose too
much precaution. It is true that liability cannot implement a level of precaution
larger than x∗(qy). However, if it is optimal to implement some x > x∗(qy) at the
cost of ineﬃciently high precaution levels for injurers who can cause small harm
only, this can be achieved by regulation alone. In this case, the additional use of
liability would simply have no eﬀect. Hence, joint use of regulation and liability
can never be socially advantageous if wealth y is the same for each injurer. This
result is in sharp contrast with Shavell (1984a).
4 Wealth varies among injurers
Now assume that wealth varies among injurers. For simplicity, suppose that there
are only two diﬀerent wealth classes, poor people with wealth yp and rich people
13Shavell (1984a) assumes L = h and q < 1. He briefly considers increasing liability in his
footnote 9, but suggests that the essential nature of his results would be the same. Note that
all results in the present paper are also valid for q = 1, the case most often considered in the
literature. In this case, the punitive multiple disappears (L∗ = h).
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with wealth yr, where 0 < yp < yr ≤ 1q . Let the proportion of poor people be given
by p ∈ (0, 1).14 Assume that the same instruments are available as in last section.
If regulation alone is used, the optimal standard is still given by sR = x∗(E(h)),
and the expected social costs TCR(sR) remain unchanged. While the optimal
magnitude of liability continues to be L∗ = hq , the expected social costs if liability
alone is employed are now given by
pTCL(yp) + (1− p)TCL(yr).
One might be tempted to think that, in the spirit of Proposition 1, regulation alone
is optimal whenever TCR(sR) is smaller than this expression. This is, however,
not true. In fact, the following proposition says that if injurers are heterogeneous
with respect to their wealth, there are situations in which it may indeed happen
that the joint use of regulation and liability leads to strictly smaller expected
social costs than the exclusive use of one of these instruments.
Proposition 2 Let the wealth of poor injurers be given by yp < yˆ, and the wealth
of rich injurers by yr >
E(h)
q . If the proportion of poor injurers, p, is suﬃciently
large, then expected total costs are strictly smaller under joint use of regulation
and liability than under either regulation or liability alone.
In order to better understand the result, note that the assumptions in Propo-
sition 2 confine attention to the interesting situation in which regulation would
be preferred if there were only poor people, while liability would be preferred if
there were only rich people (see Proposition 1). In this situation, joint use of both
14It is assumed that an injurer’s wealth has no influence on the level of harm he might cause.
Note that the case of two wealth classes is suﬃcient to show that joint use of liability and
regulation can be strictly welfare enhancing. One could of course consider the case of more
than two wealth classes, but this would only complicate the exposition without yielding any
additional economic insights.
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instruments can increase social welfare by making poor injurers stick to the reg-
ulatory standard sR and by inducing rich injurers to take optimal care over some
intermediate range of h. It is true that rich injurers with very small values of h
choose sR, and rich injurers with very high values of h choose x∗(qyr). Yet, when-
ever (in the situation considered here) exclusive regulation is better than exclusive
liability, then joint use must inevitably be even better, since under regulation all
rich injurers would choose sR.
Given that joint use of liability and regulation with standard sR is in fact
socially advantageous, one may ask whether the expected total costs could be
further decreased by choosing a regulatory standard diﬀerent from the one which
is optimal under exclusive regulation. It turns out that this is indeed the case, as
the following proposition demonstrates.
Proposition 3 If under the assumptions of the previous proposition joint use
of regulation and liability is strictly welfare-improving, the optimal standard sJ
will be strictly smaller than sR, the standard which is optimal under sole use of
regulation.
The intuitive explanation for the result is straightforward. In the considered
situation, the behavior of poor injurers is controlled by regulation only. Hence,
if there were only poor injurers, s = sR would indeed be the optimal standard
(see Section 3). Yet, the behavior of rich injurers would ideally be controlled by
liability only. If there were only rich injurers, the optimal standard would thus
be zero. Therefore, it is not surprising that the standard which is optimal given
that there are both poor and rich injurers lies between zero and sR.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper a certain class of rules (namely, strict liability, safety regulation
in the sense of a uniform minimum standard, and the combination of both) has
been taken as exogenously given. Rational behavior under these rules has been
analyzed and the socially optimal rule within the given class has been determined.
In fact, most law and economics papers proceed in this way, and it is not unusual
to discuss informational requirements of the diﬀerent rules only casually.15 In the
present model, one obviously has to assume that the level of care is verifiable,
since otherwise regulation were not possible. Furthermore, liability requires that
the harm done and the level of wealth are verifiable.
Given these assumptions there are of course rules which can implement the
first best: If an accident occurs, the court can verify whether the injurer has cho-
sen the optimal amount of care, x∗(h). Hence, injurers could easily be induced
to take optimal precaution with the help of non-monetary sanctions such as im-
prisonment (or ‘shooting them’, a common receipt in implementation theory, see
Moore, 1992).16 Alternatively, the first best could be achieved by suﬃciently re-
warding the injurer whenever an accident happens and socially optimal precaution
has been taken. While considerations that are not explicitly modelled might ren-
der such alternatives unrealistic, it remains unclear how to judge which rules have
to be taken into account.
In any case, one possible modification of the analyzed rules comes to mind
15In contrast, from a mechanism design point of view one should start with the informational
assumptions and endogenously determine the class of rules which is feasible under these assump-
tions. This distinction is related to the one between the recent theory of incomplete contracts
(see Hart, 1995) and traditional complete contracts theory. Cf. also Schmitz (2001).
16Note that suﬃciently high sanctions are implicitly assumed to be possible in order to enforce
the regulatory standard.
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which may deserve further discussion. Assume that when wealth varies among
injurers and joint use of regulation and liability is welfare-improving according to
Proposition 2, the regulatory standard may now depend on y. In this case, the
arguments of Proposition 1 become valid again and it is never optimal to control
the behavior of an injurer by liability and regulation simultaneously. Instead,
poor injurers will have to comply to the optimal regulatory standard sR, while
the behavior of rich injurers will be controlled by liability only. In other words
this means that poor people face a standard of sR > 0, while rich people face a
standard of 0, which of course might again be unacceptable since one could argue
that it violates the equal protection clause. This discussion clearly illustrates that
more attention should be devoted to a careful explanation of why the restriction
to certain exogenously given rules may be reasonable.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Note first that L∗ = 1qh induces the injurer to take optimal precaution, xL =
x∗(h), in the case hq ≤ y.
Next, consider the case hq > y. In this case nothing would be gained if L were
larger than hq , since the injurer would still choose xL = x
∗(qy). It remains to show
that L < hq could not lead to smaller social costs. If y ≤ L <
h
q , the injurer
again would choose x∗(qy). If L < y, the injurer would choose x∗(qL) < x∗(qy),
which means that the social costs C(x)+(1−x)h would be higher (since they are
convex, minimized by x∗(h) and x∗(qy) < x∗(h)).
Proof of Proposition 1.
The proof consists of three steps, the first of which shows that there is a
unique threshold value yˆ > 0, such that regulation is socially better than liability
if y is smaller than yˆ, and liability is better than regulation otherwise. The second
step establishes yˆ < E(h)q . Finally, it is demonstrated in the third step that the
simultaneous use of liability and regulation cannot increase social welfare.
(i) Regulation is clearly better than liability if injurers have no wealth (formally,
sR = x∗(E(h)) > 0 implies TCL(0) = TCR(0) > TCR(sR)). On the other
hand, if y = 1q , which means that the wealth constraint is never binding,
liability achieves the socially optimal solution, so that TCL(1q ) < TCR(sR).A
simple intermediate value argument can now be applied. Note that TCL(y)
is a continuous function which is strictly decreasing:
d
dy
TCL(y) =
Z 1
qy
(C 0 (x∗ (qy))− h) dx
∗(qy)
dy
dF (h)
=
q
C 00(x∗(qy))
Z 1
qy
(qy − h) dF (h) < 0,
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where (1) and (2) have been used. Hence, there exists a unique cut-oﬀ value
yˆ ∈ (0, 1q ), such that regulation is preferred if y is smaller than yˆ, and liability
is preferred otherwise.
(ii) In order to proof yˆ < E(h)q , it must be shown that TCR(sR)−TCL(
E(h)
q ) > 0.
Using (3), this condition can be rewritten asZ E(h)
0
(C(x∗(E(h))) + (1− x∗(E(h)))h) dF (h)
>
Z E(h)
0
(C(x∗(h)) + (1− x∗(h))h) dF (h),
which is clearly true due to the definition of x∗(h).
(iii) In order to see that joint use of liability and regulation (with some given
standard s) cannot improve social welfare, consider first the case s > x∗(qy).
Then joint use is equivalent to the sole use of regulation, since liability cannot
induce the injurer to choose more care than x∗(qy). Behavior would in fact
be controlled by regulation only, so that additional liability would simply
be superfluous. The case s = 0 is obviously equivalent to exclusive use of
liability. It remains to show that joint use of liability and regulation with
0 < s ≤ x∗(qy) cannot be optimal. In this case, expected total costs are
given by TCJ(s, y). By the definition of x∗(h), this expression is clearly larger
than TCL(y), so that total costs could be reduced by making use of liability
only. Hence, it can never be socially advantageous to use a combination of
liability and regulation.
Proof of Proposition 2.
In the first step of the proof, the expected total costs resulting from the exclu-
sive use of either regulation or liability are compared. If this comparison favors
regulation, social costs can be strictly reduced by additional liability, as will be
argued in the second step.
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(i) Exclusive use of regulation is socially better than exclusive use of liability
whenever
pTCL(yp) + (1− p)TCL(yr) ≥ TCR(sR),
which is equivalent to p ≥ pˆ, where
pˆ =
TCR(sR)− TCL(yr)
TCL(yp)− TCL(yr)
.
Note that under the assumptions of the proposition, 0 < pˆ < 1 is guaranteed.
(ii) Consider the case pˆ < p < 1. Since x∗(qyp) < x∗(qyˆ) < x∗(E(h)) = sR
and x∗(qyr) > x∗(E(h)) = sR, the expected social costs under joint use of
liability and regulation with standard sR are given by
pTCR(sR) + (1− p)TCJ(sR, yr).
Hence, it remains to show that this expression is strictly smaller than TCR(sR).
This is clearly the case, since
TCR(sR)− TCJ(sR, yr)
=
Z qyr
E(h)
(C(sR) + (1− sR)h− (C(x∗(h)) + (1− x∗(h))h)) dF (h)
+
Z 1
qyr
(C(sR) + (1− sR)h− (C(x∗(qyr)) + (1− x∗(qyr))h)) dF (h)
must be strictly positive due to the definition of x∗(h) and due to the fact
that C(x) + (1− x)h is decreasing for x < x∗(h).
Proof of Proposition 3.
Consider again the situation of Proposition 2, so that joint use of liability
and regulation with standard sR is socially better than exclusive use of liability
or regulation alone. The optimal standard sJ cannot be smaller than x∗(qyp),
since otherwise liability alone would have been optimal. Similarly, sJ cannot be
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larger than x∗(qyr), because this would be equivalent to pure regulation and hence
contradict the fact that sR = x∗(E(h)) is smaller than x∗(qyr). In the relevant
range of s, expected total costs are thus given by
pTCR(s) + (1− p)TCJ(s, yr).
The first derivative of this expression with respect to s equals
p (C 0(s)−E(h)) + (1− p)
Z C0(s)
0
(C 0(s)− h) dF (h).
The second derivative is given by
[p+ (1− p)F (C 0(s))]C 00(s) > 0,
so that the expected total costs are convex in s. In order to prove that the optimal
standard sJ is smaller than sR, it has to be shown that the first derivative is
positive at s = sR. Using (3), it is straightforward to see that
p (C 0(sR)−E(h)) + (1− p)
Z C0(sR)
0
(C 0(sR)− h) dF (h)
= (1− p)
Z E(h)
0
(E(h)− h) dF (h),
which obviously is positive.
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